Writer: Christian Choi | Editor: Isabelle Verduzco

Abstract: Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (1984) was a cornerstone of administrative law, governing the United States executive branch’s role in resolving statutory ambiguities where courts could not. This framework allowed federal agencies to apply their subject-matter expertise in administering complex regulatory schemes set out by Congressional statutes. The Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024) overruled Chevron, no longer giving agencies special deference and holding that federal courts must now exercise sole authority in interpreting the meaning of statutes. Loper Bright is sure to disrupt the landscape of administrative law, and has already been speculated to leave agency regulations vulnerable to legal challenges and weaken the authority of agency guidance. As one of the most cited Supreme Court decisions of all time, the death of Chevron will fundamentally reshape administrative law jurisprudence. This article situates Loper Bright within the broader debate over agency deference and examines its effects on child welfare governance, specifically on the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) enforcement of Title IV-E regulations outlined in the Social Security Act. Loper Bright and the recent winds of curtailing agency power leaves the HHS vulnerable to rogue litigation, ultimately threatening the efficacy of Title IV-E enforcement, a crucial regulatory tool for ensuring best child welfare practices.

Writer: Brianna Gonzalez Ulloa | Editor: Kaiyi Pan

Abstract: Deepfake technology has revolutionized how sexual images can be generated and distributed online, raising critical questions about consent, privacy, and legal accountability. This article examines how courts have traditionally treated sexually exploitative imagery—particularly through child pornography jurisprudence and revenge pornography statutes—and argues that existing legal frameworks are ill-suited to address the unique harms posed by non-consensual deepfake pornography. By synthesizing principles from New York v. Ferber and its progeny, as well as recent state and federal efforts to combat image-based sexual abuse, the article posits that deepfake pornography should be classified as a distinct form of sexual exploitation. A modified Miller v. California standard is proposed to regulate such content to be more centered on consent, identifiable harm to real victims, and the wide-ranging consequences of digital circulation. Miller, which established the current legal test for obscenity, is reexamined here through the lens of technological evolution and victim-centered harm. In doing so, the article offers a path toward safeguarding individual autonomy in the age of artificial intelligence and ensuring that the law keeps pace with rapidly evolving technological threats.

Writer: Matthew Inui | Editor: Sacha Franjola

Abstract: Although sovereign immunity is a well-established principle of international law, recent developments have challenged its application in cases involving gross human rights violations—especially those that breach jus cogens norms. One of the most visible modern examples is a civil case brought by Korean comfort women against Japan for the forced sexual slavery they endured during World War II. In a move that was perhaps ahead of its time, the Korean court sided with the plaintiffs, ruling that sovereign immunity does not apply to gross human rights abuses. While this diverges from a longstanding precedent set by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Korean court’s decision reflects a growing trend in international legal thinking—one that rejects sovereign immunity for violations of jus cogens human rights norms. This article argues that in light of recent developments in state practice and evolving understandings of customary law, the Korean courts were justified in recognizing the validity of the comfort women’s case. Although far from establishing any universal legal principle, the decision by the Korean courts made an essential contribution to a new component of international customary law: a jus cogens exception to the law of sovereign immunity.

Writer: Alyssandra Lachica | Editor: Isabella Marasco
Abstract: In the aftermath of the January 6th attack on the United States Capitol, questions of presidential accountability and executive authority have come to define a pivotal moment in American legal and constitutional history. Such a reckoning became subject to legal scrutiny in the landmark case Trump v. United States (2024), where the Supreme Court ruled that official actions that fall under the president’s “conclusive and preclusive authority” are immune from criminal prosecution. This decision, aimed at preserving the autonomy of the executive branch, has faced widespread criticism for its lack of constitutional grounding and utter disregard for historical precedent. The ruling’s ability to undermine the principle of accountability has already been tested during Donald Trump’s second presidential term, where scholars are defining his series of executive orders as a “constitutional crisis.” This article aims to critique the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trump by applying legal positivist H.L.A. Hart’s framework of primary and secondary rules. Hart’s theory—which defines primary rules as imposing societal obligations and secondary rules as establishing the structure for creating, amending, and adjudicating those obligations—provides a lens to critically examine the Court’s flawed reasoning. Building on this critique, this article proposes a new framework for assessing presidential immunity that incorporates intent. This approach distinguishes between lawful and unlawful actions within the executive branch’s constitutional authority and draws a line between official and unofficial actions of the president. Using this framework, the article revisits the Trump decision, arguing for its reversal to restore the balance of power among the branches of government and to uphold the principle that all public officials should be subject to the rule of law.

Writer: Robert Paronyan | Editor: Shivanshi Sharma

Abstract: Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors have become central to corporate strategy, resulting in the rise of greenwashing—misleading or exaggerated ESG claims. This raises concerns about corporate accountability. While the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has brought enforcement actions against greenwashing under Rule 10b-5, which outlaws securities fraud, these regulatory violations also open a board of directors up to Caremark oversight failures. This article argues that greenwashing constitutes a mission critical risk under Caremark and courts should recognize greenwashing related oversight failures as a basis for director liability. Building on the Caremark framework established in Marchand v. Barnhill and In re Clovis Oncology, Inc., this article presents two paths for shareholders to hold corporate boards accountable for greenwashing. First, the regulatory piggyback theory demonstrates how SEC enforcement actions can bolster the validity of Caremark claims, as courts increasingly recognize regulatory scrutiny as an indicator of mission critical oversight failures. Second, even in the absence of enforcement, greenwashing can independently qualify as mission critical when it directly impacts a company’s core business operations. This article applies Caremark’s two-pronged test to three forms of greenwashing—unverifiable ESG claims, unmet sustainability pledges, and misuse of certified labels—to show how each can lead to Caremark liability.

Writer: Anton Stover | Editor: Sam Razifad

Abstract: The over 200 treaties created between the United States and various Indigenous nations between 1776 and 1871 provide the basis for modern-day Indigenous land holdings and the protection of the resources on tribal lands, but they remain insufficient. Native American treaties have a long history with the Supreme Court, resulting in requirements of redress that create high barriers for Indigenous nations. Currently, treaties form the basis of several suits, including the recent Arizona v. Navajo Nation (2023). These build off of principles of “fiduciary duty” between the United States and Indigenous groups and dispute whether the United States has adequately provided for the materials in treaties. This article will discuss treaties to piece together both the ways in which treaty law creates a confusing system, and the difficulties that Indigenous groups have in modern times to get adequate redress through enforcement of treaty rights. This article will advocate for the application of common law principles to these decisions, as well as a more historically and culturally-informed understanding of Indigenous concepts of treaties.

Writer: Adrian Tam | Editor: Hillah Greenberg

Abstract: Since Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty, the Central People’s Government (CPG) has persistently encroached upon the city’s promised autonomy. Article 23 of the Basic Law, which ostensibly grants Hong Kong the authority to enact national security legislation of its own accord, has paradoxically enabled direct CPG intervention. Its vague and expansive provisions have facilitated legal overreach by undermining the city’s political and legal independence. The government’s response to the 2019 Anti-Extradition protests—the 2020 National Security Law and the 2024 Safeguarding National Security Ordinance—reflects a growing reliance on legislative ambiguity. These laws, laden with redundant and obscure provisions, escalate penalties for offenses already criminalized under colonial-era statutes and significantly expand state authority over dissent. The article argues that the enactment of these laws raises concerns regarding their constitutionality, necessity, and compliance with human rights obligations. Compounding these concerns is the judiciary’s inconsistent approach to national security cases, which has weakened public confidence in its neutrality and raised fears of selective enforcement. This article concludes that preserving Hong Kong’s autonomy and its human rights obligations under the One Country, Two Systems framework is essential to maintaining the city’s global standing. As Hong Kong grapples with a deepening crisis of confidence in its legal and political institutions—exacerbated by the government’s aggressive enforcement of national security laws—it must resist further erosion of its legal independence and prevent further unchecked expansion of national security legislation.

Writer: Vivian Lombardi

Abstract: In the shadow of the extraordinary rendition program and the U.S.’ weaponization of “enhanced interrogation techniques” against detainees, the legacy of torture continues to beleaguer the Guantanamo Bay military commissions judiciary and hinder the administration of justice. Situated in nebulous legal terrain, Guantanamo’s trial system circumvents the protective ambit of American law, allowing the U.S. to bypass universal human rights standards and deprive detainees of fair trials. Particularly noxious is the U.S.’ relentless pursuit to admit torturederived evidence into proceedings — a blatant violation of universal norms. Despite international condemnation of the use of such evidence, its admissibility still ignites fervent debate. However, a landmark ruling in United States v. Al-Nashiri emerges as the focal point of this analysis after a military judge invoked the Constitution’s exclusionary rule and the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine to vacate all torturetainted evidence against detainee, Abd al-Rahim Al-Nashiri. This unprecedented decision stands as the first beacon of legal rectitude for detainees whose coerced confessions have been leveraged against them. As Al-Nashiri’s death penalty trial nears its denouement in 2024, the Court faces a momentous decision — one that demands an affirmation of the inadmissibility of all torture-tainted evidence. Such a ruling would not only exonerate Al-Nashiri but recalibrate the legal landscape of the military commissions, setting a precedent that may render other detainees beyond prosecutorial reach. It is long overdue that the U.S. redress the ongoing plight of detainees marked by torture; as their arbitrary and indefinite detention continues, the sanctity of American constitutionalism hangs in the balance.

Writer: Dylan Ek | Editor: Anton Stover

Abstract: Federal diversity jurisdiction is a mechanism by which a lawsuit can be filed in or moved to federal court if the parties to the case reside in different states. It accounts for about 30% of all cases in federal court and is also governed by one of the most complex doctrines in American law: the Erie doctrine, deriving from the Court’s landmark decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. Congress established diversity jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789 as a way to protect out-of-state litigants from biased state courts. However, this system was rife with forum shopping, where parties moved lawsuits from state court to federal court to get a more favorable result, as federal interpretations of common law were often more business-friendly than those of state courts. The Supreme Court sought to resolve this in Erie by requiring that federal courts follow state rules on all “substantive” issues when hearing cases under diversity jurisdiction. What should be considered substantive has been the question at the center of a series of Supreme Court cases since, which has produced a family of complex tests to determine whether an area of law is substantive, but in many cases still provides no concrete answer. Today, out-of-state bias has largely gone away, but federal diversity jurisdiction still remains in its originally broad form. This article will argue that the current application of diversity jurisdiction undermines the legislative intent of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and that courts should require litigants to prove out-of-state bias before moving cases to federal court, both to prevent forum shopping and to reduce the impact that the Erie doctrine’s complexity and ambiguity has on American laI.

Writer: Willem Ellis | Editor: Kaitlyn Cui
Abstract: At least 16 states have passed laws banning discussion of sexual orientation and gender identity in public school classrooms for young children. One such state is Florida, which bans discussion of these topics through eighth grade and heavily restricts them thereafter. This policy discriminates against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer individuals (LGBTQ+), denying them access to an equal education. Instead, these students must confront feelings of shame, inferiority, and dehumanization in a potentially unsafe learning environment. Though freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed under the First Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has created an exception permitting restrictions on the speech of public-school teachers when acting pursuant to their official duties. Upon initial review, Florida’s law also appears unconstitutionally vague, in violation of Supreme Court precedent. However, if faced with a question as to the law’s vagueness, a court could clarify the meaning of its provisions rather than end its enforcement. To avoid this loophole, this article argues that litigation to invalidate this law and protect LGBTQ+ youth in Florida should instead focus on its violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Because Florida’s law has a discriminatory effect against LGBTQ+ people and was enacted with discriminatory intent, challengers will have the greatest chance of success if they question its constitutionality on these grounds. However, they should exercise caution because Florida’s legislation utilizes a private enforcement mechanism that presents challenges to establishing legal standing for lawsuit

Writer: Samantha Parr | Editor: Anahit Gevorgyants

Abstract: Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has issued a series of originalist decisions in Second Amendment cases that have systematically overturned state and federal firearm possession regulations. In the most recent decision in this trend, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, the Court introduced a new, highly originalist guideline whereby the government must identify “relevantly similar” historical analogues of firearm restrictions to uphold modern restrictions. However, the Court failed to provide key guidelines for lower courts to use in evaluating the constitutionality of analogues for modern restrictions and has contributed to significant lower court disagreement. This polarizing debate most directly affects the Court’s pending decision in United States v. Rahimi, which involves a statute criminalizing firearm possession by individuals subject to domestic violence restraining orders. Despite Bruen’s originalist framework, there are still ways that the Court can practice a holistic, fair evaluation of the Rahimi statute and its analogues in order to ensure that the modern-day context is not disproportionately outweighed by founding era ideals. This article proposes four important considerations to guide courts through applying the Bruen standard to counteract its ambiguity

Writer: Bella Brannon | Editor: Kalani Castillo

Abstract: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) protects the religious rights of incarcerated individuals by mandating that an institution must have a compelling state interest and use the least restrictive means to achieve that interest. However, RLUIPA falls short in securing the rights of incarcerated individuals established in the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause due to a broad application of these requirements, over-reliance on the deference of prison officials, and inconsistent interpretations of federal courts. Further, the application of due deference has diluted the strict scrutiny mandated by RLUIPA. As a result, the jurisprudence surrounding RLUIPA lacks clarity and courts rely on the guidance of prison officials instead of the sincere convictions of incarcerated individuals and the specific merits of their requested accommodations. Under its current framework, courts issue contradictory interpretations of RLUIPA, prisons incorrectly apply its provisions, and incarcerated individuals face undue obstacles in exercising their religion. Minority faiths face particular detriment. For RLUIPA to serve its intended purpose, strict scrutiny must apply with due deference only being granted in areas in which prison officials have expertise and not in interpreting the prerogatives of a faith

Writer: Zoie Burt | Editor: Lauren Williams

Abstract: The U.S. federalist system of government permits states to create different laws regarding public female toplessness, and most states have prohibited this. Multiple courts have rejected First Amendment free speech and/or Fourteenth Amendment equal protection reasoning in cases where plaintiffs argue laws prohibiting public female toplessness are unconstitutional. This article will use recent cases, namely Tagami v. City of Chicago and Free the Nipple v. City of Fort Collins, to argue that courts’ rejections of these arguments are based on outdated patriarchal and discriminatory modes of thinking. Courts should use the more rigorous standard of review (strict scrutiny) to analyze these cases instead of just intermediate scrutiny. The article concludes by noting how current circuit highlight how there is a conflict within the American legal system’s application of the constitutional laws regarding legalizing public female toplessness. It is, therefore, pertinent for the Supreme Court to hear an appellate case regarding this to resolve conflicting laws between states and ultimately legalize public female toplessness nationwide to grant women the same legal rights and bodily autonomy as men.

Writer: Melody Seraydarian | Editor: Rafay Siddiqui

Abstract: Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code significantly restricts freedom of expression by criminalizing the denigration of key state institutions: the “Turkish Nation,” the government, the judicial system, and its national security institutions. Consequently, this provision impedes on Turkey’s European Union (EU) accession prospects—particularly under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)—which stipulates the precise conditions in which nations may legitimately restrict speech. The multiplex relationship between Turkey’s national legislation and agenda, and international human rights law reinforces a troubling incongruity amidst freedom of expression jurisprudence, which has caused notable Article 301 cases to be viewed as politically motivated prosecutions to silence dissent. The arbitrary provision has not only stifled discourse—particularly journalism and academic historical criticism—but has also attracted international condemnation for its contradistinction of the ECHR. By ensuring this provision is in line with human rights, Turkey will better protect individual rights, materially improve free speech standards, and refine its application for EU accession

Writer: Nathaniel Catlin | Editor: Zoie Burt

Abstract: The U.S. military’s biotechnological research is currently regulated by a legal framework that bars soldiers from receiving compensation for damages pursuant to their participation and nullifies deterrents against conducting research unconstitutionally. As a result of adjudicating upon issues reserved for Congress, the Supreme Court has severely narrowed the applicability of compensation mechanisms for military personnel damaged during active-duty service, such as in the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA), as well as the applicability of deterrents against unconstitutional human experimentation. When considered alongside the broad defenses offered to private government contractors and the goals of current military research, the problems caused by a lack of compensation and deterrence will only continue to increase in severity and urgency. These issues may be resolved through the development of alternative legal doctrines or the reformation of current doctrines guiding the legal framework surrounding biotechnological research. Congress must also address the policy judgments the Court has mistakenly reserved for itself and regulate the pursuit of future biotechnological research.

Writer: Emma Canavan | Editor: Sarah Wang

Abstract: The birth registration system in England and Wales is not sufficiently inclusive of families that exist outside the cis-heterosexual model. Under the current legislative regime, parentage will always be initially recorded according to the biological role played by the individual, regardless of their gender identity. Hence, a transgender man who is the child’s gestational parent will be legally recognized as their child’s ‘mother,’ despite fulfilling the role of father in all other regards. Not only do these legal records pose a threat of ‘outing’ the parent - and thereby opening them up to potential discrimination - but also risk exacerbating feelings of genderdysphoria. This article argues that there is a pressing need for reform and considers that the dual implementation of an anonymous births regime, along with genderneutral language to record parentage, would best promote child and parent welfare.

Writer: Dylan Ek | Editor: Japji Singh
Abstract: The federal government has recently tried to respond to nationwide droughts and water shortages driven by climate change by funding the construction of new dams and reservoirs. However, environmental concerns have led states to resist these projects, raising the question of what legal rights the federal government has when building dams. Under the doctrine of navigable servitude that originates from the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court has recognized Congress’ right to build dams and reservoirs over the objections of state and local authorities. However, the Supreme Court has also found that the powers of the executive branch are more limited in building dams and ignoring state laws to do so. Any considerations by the federal government as to what avenues, executive or congressional, are available to them in initiating large-scale construction to address national water shortages must consider these differing treatments imposed by the judiciary. This article will argue that the Court has created an avenue through which the federal government can achieve its newly reaffirmed goal of taking a larger role in managing the national water crisis of the 21st century.

Writer: Janet Zamudio | Editor: Gali Hoffman

Abstract: The current state of climate change and environmental justice is continuously evolving. With local, state, and federal environmental entities working against the constant threats of climate change and environmental injustice, it is of great concern to examine the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Despite the precedent set by the Clean Air Act of 1963, the provisions in the amended Clean Air Act of 1990, Brown v. EPA, Massachusetts v. EPA, and American Electric Co. v. Connecticut — the EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in the private sector was halted. The Court’s rationale is inconsistent and contradictory when compared to its previous rulings. In addition to this, the Court invokes the Major Questions Doctrine (MQD), which will only further develop judicial restrictions on federal agencies. With irrefutable legal and policy implications, it is necessary to establish an Environmental Justice Doctrine in a future Court ruling to render West Virginia v. EPA invalid. The argument set forth in this article will illuminate the inconsistency created by the West Virginia v. EPA decision and emphasize the necessity to overturn the MQD. The legal and policy proposal of overturning the MQD intends to open the door for new climate-change-based policies and impose necessary environmental regulations

Writer: Roz Kohan | Editor: Alexander Azilazian

Abstract: China’s e-justice technologies violate the right to a fair trial protected under international law. The digitized system used in China, which consists of the use of Internet courts, judicial blockchain, and legal AI, developed as a result of an overburdened judicial system and to increase access to justice. However, its use has posed ethical concerns regarding limited accessibility,systemic and algorithmic bias, transparency, security, and data privacy. These issues and their ramifications ultimately violate international human rights law. In order to ensure that rising court technology upholds the right to a fair trial, existing international case law should be used as grounds for the development of just guidelines for use.

Writer: Rina Rossi | Editor: Leila Chiddick

Abstract: Transgender and non-binary individuals have faced discrimination in U.S. tax laws, encountered barriers to accessing reproductive healthcare, and are not widely acknowledged as menstruators by the current menstrual equity movement. California AB 31, a menstrual equity bill, fails to use gender-inclusive language to acknowledge transgender and non-binary individuals as menstruators. This article argues that the gender-exclusive language used in California AB 31 is a violation of Bostock v. Clay County, which found that discrimination against transgender individuals is inextricably tied to sex. Specifically, AB 31 applies the “but-for” causation standard and follows Justice Gorsuch’s definition of transgender discrimination being “inextricably bound up with sex.” Ultimately, in order for California AB 31 to achieve menstrual equity for all, California legislators should employ the gender-neutral language used in the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 discussed in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs and California AB 36

Writer:Valentina Macchione

Abstract: This article will discuss the legality of California’s Proposition 12, as well as the legal implications of its potential reversal by the Supreme Court on human and animal rights. My argument will primarily focus on the pending Supreme Court case, National Pork Producers Council (NPPC) v. Ross, in which the constitutionality of this statute is currently being decided. To contextualize my analysis, I will provide a background on current pork production practices in the United States (U.S.), in addition to the legislative history and passage of Proposition 12 in the state of California. Through the use of the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution as a legal framework to assess the reverberations of a NPPC decision, I will showcase the unintended impact of a narrowed or expanded interpretation of the extraterritoriality doctrine on human and animal rights. The counter position of farm animal welfare and the preservation of human rights in this case is a dilemma in which one party stands to benefit at the expense of the other. Because the fabric of the American legal system is woven in such a way that laws interpreted in one context may unintentionally impact seemingly unrelated decisions in another, it is imperative that the potential implications of a Supreme Court ruling on this matter be given thoughtful consideration.

Writer: Patrick Ma | Editor: Catherine Hamilton

Abstract: The internet has given large corporations huge platforms to spread misinformation in their advertising. Due to the statute of limitations defense, government agencies are unable to effectively discourage this misinformation by themselves. Companies using the defense are more protected from government-led lawsuits, giving them little reason to stop making those misrepresentations and allowing them to get away with spreading more false information. Traditionally, for situations when the statute of limitations defense has produced inequitable results, courts have developed exceptions to the usual rules of the defense. However, none of the exceptions permit the government to discourage consumer fraud without dismantling the statute of limitations defense. This article argues that because of the statute of limitations defense, government agencies alone are unable to stop misinformation in advertising. Therefore, agencies should focus their broad investigative powers on exposing the fraud and stopping it with injunctive relief. Joint action by the government and the private market will discourage misinformation in advertising without doing undue damage to the statute of limitations defense.

Writer: Japji Singh | Editor: Gali Hoffman

Abstract: The nature of the school environment as a nursery of democracy is such that judiciary bodies must balance the competing interests of civil discourse with the motivation of the school to create an undisrupted learning environment. Tinker v. Des Moines first introduced a balancing test many decades ago and later Courts developed it further within First Amendment doctrine. In its first opportunity to rule on social media student speech in Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L., the Supreme Court presented a vague rationale that sidestepped the issue of social media entirely. This absence of a prevailing standard has become increasingly salient as the rise of online communications engenders its outsized role in the daily lives of students. The lack of guidance, coupled with disagreement among the lower courts, creates the need for a new, extendable standard. To fulfill this need, this article develops a multi-tiered methodology that considers the content of the speech, the nature of the speech’s medium, and the intent of the student speaker to inform the proscribability of such speech and resolve a pressing issue that concerns students nationwide.

Writer: Carmen Le | Editor: Valentina Macchione

Abstract: The public charge inadmissibility test, which excludes prospective immigrants that are perceived as a potential drain on public resources, has been a part of United States (U.S.) immigration policy for nearly 150 years. Since its initial inclusion in the Immigration Act of 1882, the shifting definition of the public charge determination has allowed the federal government to discriminate against prospective citizens based on factors including race, income, ability, and sexuality. Currently, a Republican-led coalition of states is asking the Supreme Court to reinstate the Trump-era Final Rule. The article argues that the Court should use this opportunity to abolish the public charge determination as a vehicle for discrimination. The continued application of the public charge test violates Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 because it discriminates against applicants based on their ability and health status and causes a “chilling effect” that prevents vulnerable populations from accessing essential public services for fear that utilizing them may count negatively against their immigration applications. Ultimately, the public charge determination is part of a greater trend of American immigration laws embodying exclusionary and discriminatory attitudes toward anyone the U.S. government considers undesirable and unworthy of citizenship.

Writer: Mischa Gureghian Hall| Editor: Lauren Enge

Abstract: The present threat of abortion bans in the United States endangers the basic rights of privacy, bodily autonomy, and non-discrimination that are enshrined in international law. The Inter-American System of Human Rights (IAS) imposes binding obligations on the U.S. to safeguard these rights. The jurisprudences of IAS organs expand on clear rights to bodily autonomy, respect for privacy and family life, and nondiscrimination within international law. The Inter-American Court applied these rights to reproductive autonomy in the 2012 case Murillo v. Costa Rica. Under the Supreme Court’s arbitrariness test, recent attempts to restrict abortion constitute arbitrary interferences in individuals’ private and family lives and result in discriminatory effects that violate international law. The most prominent of these restrictions, Texas Senate Bill 8, is being considered in Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson; the U.S. Supreme Court is now positioned to strike down the right to abortion. In the event that the Court does acts to nullify Roe v. Wade, the Inter-American System provides the only remaining effective avenue to safeguard the reproductive rights of women in the United States.

Writer: Tony Maquiling | Editor: Sahej Ahuja

Abstract: Non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) are a new form of conflict between state and non-state groups, earning them special designations in both character and international law. These conflicts have become more common and harmful to non-combatants since the second half of the 20th century. International humanitarian law (IHL) and the laws of armed conflict (LOAC), however, have not changed to adequately regulate NIACs. As a result, states engage in conflict without adhering to humanitarian standards and the rules of war with regards to NIACs. Even when IHL or LOAC are in force, the law is insufficient in differentiating combatants from non-combatants during wartime. This article will demonstrate how these legal lacunae result from the inadequate text of conventional regulations, like the Geneva Conventions, and from international court decisions, like the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Failure to adapt international law to better suit the nature of NIACs will continue facilitating unnecessary deprivations of life and promote human rights disasters.

Writer: Ira Phatak | Editor: Mustafa Ahmedani

Abstract: Relics of colonialism have long pervaded modern political life, on both the domestic and international scale. Uti possidetis juris is one such archaism, a principle rooted in the legacies of colonialism that have yet to disappear from the world stage. It is a principle of customary international law that freeze-frames colonial borders to secure territorial integrity for newly independent countries and resolve border conflicts. Unfortunately, this principle’s foundation in antiquated colonial ideals raises questions about its utility for postcolonial states. This article focuses on one particular conflict, the Sino-Indian border dispute, as a lens through which to analyze the (non)functional applications of uti possidetis juris. This article argues that uti possidetis juris is an archaic principle with no place resolving the border disputes of the postcolonial world. Instead, this article will posit that border disputes must be arbitrated with an alternative in mind: the Third World Approach to International Law (TWAIL). By privileging the concept of self-determination over that of territorial integrity, the TWAIL methodology enables arbiters to consider a plethora of factors that uti possidetis juris may ignore. This article proposes that uti possidetis juris should be rejected in the context of the resolution of the Sino-Indian border dispute in favor of a TWAIL-informed international arbitration.

Writer: Talia Boyadjian | Editor: Fatima Jaber

Abstract: The homeless population of the United States is under direct attack by local governments that are weaponizing hostile architecture against them. Antihomeless legislation has been found to be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause due to cases like Martin v. City of Boise, Anderson v. Portland, and Jones v. City of Los Angeles that have defined homelessness as a status. Local governments have thus resorted to hostile architecture—the modification of buildings, seating areas, and other aspects of public property with the intent of warding off specific, “undesirable” groups of people. Hostile architecture achieves the same goals previous unconstitutional antihomeless laws did. This Article argues that hostile architecture be held to the same standard as anti-homeless legislation as it is a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the fundamental right to travel. Formal legislation should also prohibit local governments from installing hostile architecture in the first place. Finally, local governments should participate in the creation of more shelters and soup kitchens, which would provide a long-term solution to the issue.

Writer: Micah Mekbib | Editor: Ali Pond

Abstract: Every day, millions of Americans unknowingly relinquish their autonomy and right to privacy to surveillance capitalism, a burgeoning economic market that is founded upon the extraction of behavioral data in the digital world. Big Tech are the pioneers of this industry; their algorithms have perfected systems to store user data, apply it to predict users’ future behaviors, and track patterns. This article makes two main claims upon legal grounds; it first argues that the U.S. government has jeopardized Americans’ right to privacy and has undermined democratic processes since it entered an era of mass surveillance in the early 2000s. A lack of judicial oversight over the operations of public surveillance agencies has resulted in continued privacy violations on behalf of the state. Secondly, this article posits that Big Tech violates the right to self-determination by manipulating users’ information context online with surveillance capital, diminishing their individual autonomy. In line with its pro-surveillance standards, the U.S. federal government has historically failed to apply judicial oversight and digital privacy legislation to mitigate these civil infractions by public and private actors. This problematic interaction between the state and private interests generates an economic environment in which Big Tech may exploit users as it pleases.